










The main objection to negotiation with terrorists is that it encourages them to 
repeat their tactics. But it is not negotiation per se that encourages terrorism, rather 
the degree to which terrorists are able to achieve their demands by negotiation.
There are different types of terrorists, according to their reasons and goals for 
using terrorism. Contingent terrorists, such as kidnappers and hostage takers, do seek 
negotiations. Absolute terrorists, such as suicide bombers, view any negotiation as a 
betrayal of their very raison d’être.
Some absolute terrorists may become open to discussion and eventually 
moderation of their means and ultimately even of their ends. The challenge 
of negotiation is to move total absolutes into conditionals, and to work on 
contingent terrorists to either reduce or change their terms.
Effective negotiations can begin when the parties perceive themselves to be in a 
mutually hurting stalemate and see a way out. Negotiators must maintain pressure 
(stalemate) while offering a way out, thereby showing terrorists there is something 
to gain from negotiation.
Negotiators do not negotiate belief systems. They should help terrorists 
develop alternative means: changing terrorist ends can be tackled only over the 
much longer term.
Negotiation with contingent terrorists is a short-term tactic; negotiation with 
absolute terrorists is a long-term strategy. Patience and persistence will prove key 
to dealing with both contingent and absolute terrorists.
The negotiator needs to offer the conditional absolute terrorist concessions to 
his demands as the payment for abandoning his violent terrorism, not concessions 
to the pressure of terrorism itself. If the negotiator makes concessions to the 
terrorist part of the negotiation process, so too must the terrorist. Even the 
absolute terrorist organizer does have something to offer as payment — his 








The official line is that 
public authorities do 
not negotiate with 
terrorists. However, 
governments frequently 
do end up negotiating 
with hostage takers and 
kidnappers and with 
political groups classified 
as terrorists. Clearly there 
are negotiations and 
negotiations, just as there 
are terrorists and terrorists. 
While this briefing does 
not necessarily advocate 
negotiating with terrorists, 
it outlines the practicalities 
of such negotiations, 
providing a guide to 
deciding how, when, and 
with whom to negotiate.
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Introduction
Governments routinely declare that they will not negotiate with 
terrorists, and regularly (if not routinely) do so nonetheless. 
This IIASA Policy Brief highlights recent research that offers a 
step-by-step guide to the questions that governments must ask 
in deciding whether or not to negotiate and with whom, how the 
negotiation process should proceed, and with what goal in mind. 
Know your terrorist
There are different types of terrorists, according to their goals and 
purposes for using terrorism. On the one hand some terrorists, often 
hijackers and kidnappers, do want to negotiate away their captured 
“goods.” On the other hand, some terrorists view any negotiation 
as a betrayal of their very raison d’être. Such terrorists believe their 
fulfillment comes with death; hence they view their own death as a 
prized goal and the death of others as unimportant.
Types of terrorist 
Contingent terrorists are typically hostage takers and kidnappers. 
Contingent terrorists seek negotiations in order to exchange their 
victims for publicity, ransom, and release of comrades, using others’ 
lives as a bargaining tool.
Absolute terrorists are mainly involved in strategic/political terrorist 
situations and are beyond contact and communication. They commit 
a self-contained act that is not a step to a second action. Absolute 
terrorism expresses the frustration of the “suicider” with his weak 
power position and his inability to change it by any other means. 
His sense of injustice may come from revelation (fundamentalists), 
revolution (social revolutionaries) or revulsion against a 
discriminatory or corrupt world he feels owes him something. 
It is not just the suicidal tactics (means) but the unlimited cause 
(ends) that makes for truly absolute terrorism.
But among absolutes there are differences. Total absolutes have 
nothing to negotiate about or with, and any attempt at negotiation 
only encourages them. Conditional absolutes are suiciders whose 
tactics, while self-contained and absolute, are designed to seek 
finite goals. Conditional absolutes do have something to negotiate 
about — such as territory, independence, conditions — but their goal 
is usually too broad or extreme to be negotiable.
Key points
The categories of contingent and absolute terrorist may overlap 
and, more importantly, they are mobile. Some absolutes may be or 
become open to some discussion and eventually moderation of their 
means and ultimately even of their ends.
The challenge of negotiation is to move total absolutes into condi-
tionals, and work on contingents to either reduce or change their terms.
The task of negotiation
The official negotiator’s task is a difficult one. The goal is to give a 
little to make the terrorist give a lot. How can that be achieved?
Essentially, there are two appropriate negotiating strategies: 
reduce terrorists’ terms or change them. Negotiators need to 
construct legitimacy for a negotiated agreement and build the 
terrorists’ independent decision-making capabilities to think 
in terms of lowered expectations and thus of lowered demands.
Negotiators can also show terrorists that their future personal situation 
is open for discussion, although their original demands are not. These 
two messages must be delivered in tandem, indicating that while one is 
closed for discussion, the other is open and personally more compelling, 
giving them the prospect of something real and attainable. 
As in any negotiations, when terrorists become convinced that a 
search for a solution is legitimate and acceptable to both sides, 
they will join the search for a solution.
In searching for a solution, there is room for a wide range of tactics. 
At some points, take-it-or-leave-it offers are useful; at other points, 
invitations to creative thinking are appropriate. At some points, 
firmness is in order; at other points, parties can explore alternatives 
and options. Structurally, time is on the side of the negotiator, a 
point the terrorist may seek to reverse by either killing or releasing 
some of his hostages.
Key points
Negotiators have a range of tactics available, but this does not 
mean that terrorists’ demands should be considered legitimate or 
that concessions may not encourage terrorism. It all depends on how 
many of the terrorists’ demands can be considered acceptable and 




Is it wrong to negotiate with terrorists?
The main objection to negotiation with terrorists is that it 
encourages them to repeat their tactics. But it is not negotiation 
per se that encourages terrorism but rather the degree to which 
they are able to achieve their demands by negotiation.
If negotiation leads to a purely symbolic result — such as a 
radio broadcast — the terrorists are more likely to decide that 
the result is not worth the effort.
However, if negotiation leads to ransom payments, it sets a 
precedent for future negotiations and materially feeds the 
terrorist organization. Thus, encouragement comes from 
the results, not from the act of negotiating itself.
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The negotiator needs to offer the conditional absolute terrorist 
concessions to his demands as the payment for abandoning his 
violent terrorism, not concessions to the pressure of terrorism itself. 
If the negotiator makes concessions to the terrorist part of the 
negotiation process, so too must the terrorist. Even the absolute 
terrorist organizer does have something to offer as payment — his 
choice of terrorist tactics.
Dealing with absolute terrorists
Key points for negotiators
Recognize that total absolutes are beyond any negotiation and 
attempts to deal with them directly are pointless. But not all absolutes 
are totals, beyond negotiation. The point is to identify potential 
conditionals and encourage them to see the hopelessness of their 
situation and the potential hopefulness in responding to negotiations.
Address the issues beyond the terrorism. Terrorism is ultimately 
related to such structural issues as poverty and inequality that are far 
beyond any immediate remedy. But steady attention to related issues 
of importance to potential supporters may eventually reap rewards.
Do not negotiate a belief system. In the course of implementing 
the outcome of a negotiation it may be possible to instill doubt 
about the basis of motivating beliefs, but the negotiation itself 
needs to focus on specific items.
Recognise that unlike many hostage/kidnapping situations, the 
acts of absolute terrorists are not self-contained events. Hence 
negotiation is not an autonomous subject or policy but a long process. 
Respect is the basic condition of any negotiation. “One-down” 
approaches that seek to impart a sense of inferiority are unproductive.
Effective negotiations can begin when the parties perceive 
themselves to be in a mutually hurting stalemate and see a way 
out. Maintain pressure (stalemate) while offering a way out. 
Show terrorists that there is something to gain from negotiation.
Mediation is often necessary: the mediator can both carry 
messages and formulate ideas. Neither party trusts the other, 
but both must trust the mediator for mediation to work.
Identification, separation, and moderation are the general aims 










Negotiating with kidnappers and 
hostage takers
Hostage taking, kidnapping, and hostage-barricade situations call 
by definition for negotiation. If terrorist demands concern issues 
such as money, freedom for prisoners, or access to media, then a 
negotiation can take place.
In setting out a process of preparation, organization, and 
implementation for dealing with hostage takers and kidnappers, 
Faure and Zartman point to numerous lessons learned from 
previous negotiation situations. For example:
The first hour of hostage taking is usually the most dangerous 
for hostages, as the terrorists are both nervous and aggressive. 
When the situation has become more stable, the risk of having 
to face unexpected events reduces on both sides. Then, the real 
negotiation can start.
Negotiators must not be decision makers. The negotiator in 
contact with the terrorists may develop some empathy toward 
them, and may therefore be influenced by them; he/she should 
not make strategic decisions.
A psychological moment occurs when it is possible to conclude 
a negotiation. While there is no exact formula for predicting 
when this moment will be, there will be some indications that the 
situation is ready for settlement. For example, when the terrorist 
keeps talking longer than necessary to the negotiator, when he 
speaks about something other than the debated issues, and when 
he starts considering the future.
When authorities resolve to make an assault on hostage takers, 
then the purpose of negotiation is not to reach an agreement, but 
rather to prepare for assault by collecting information, exhausting 
the captors, and reducing their level of vigilance. For example, 
in a Lima hostage taking that lasted four months, the terrorists 
asked for games to keep people busy. Chess pieces were provided 






Jan Pronk, Head of the United Nations Mission in Sudan, urges 
civilians and rebel forces in Northern Darfur to refrain from 
attacks and engage in peace talks (October 2006).
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open to talks. Split moderates from extremists by emphasizing 
alternative means to the moderates at a lower cost than the use of 
terror. Moderation is a process and not a condition of negotiation. 
Engagement in negotiation, and the new situation it produces, can 
gradually produce deeper changes, but this will take time.
Investigation, contact, and communication are the general means 
of negotiation with absolute terrorists. Find out as much as possible 
about the terrorists’ values and goals. Establish and maintain 
contact. Contacts are the crux of negotiation. Building contacts 
will doubtless be in secret but must be backed by public statements 
indicating openness to negotiate. Use step-by-step agreements to 
advance terrorist negotiations. Negotiation is a matter of giving 
something to get something; hence the negotiator needs to offer 
the terrorist concessions to his demands as the payment for his 
abandonment of violent terrorism. The terrorist too must make 
concessions, and the absolute terrorist does have something to 
offer as payment — his choice of terrorist tactics.
Conclusions
Specific tactics must be employed for negotiating with contingent 
terrorists, who are seeking negotiations. Specific tactics must 
also be employed for opening the possibility of negotiating with 
absolutes who currently refuse negotiations.
The key challenges facing negotiators are: to sense who the 
contingents are among the absolutes and to convert them to 
negotiability; to reduce and then change the terms of trade for the 
cessation of terrorist means, whether the release of hostages or the 
cessation of suicides; and to move from a reduction of means (terror) 
to a reduction of ends (motivations).






This Policy Brief is based on “The Mediator’s Toolkit: Negotiating 
with Terrorists,” by Guy Olivier Faure and I William Zartman 
(United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming). To request 
preprints, e-mail macaspac@iiasa.ac.at.
Guy Olivier Faure is Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne University, 
Paris V, where he teaches international negotiation, conflict 
resolution, and strategic thinking and action. I William Zartman is 
Jacob Blaustein Professor of Conflict Resolution and International 
Organization at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, USA. Both are members 
of the steering committee of IIASA’s Processes of International 
Negotiation (PIN) Program. See www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/PIN.
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A soldier of the Sudan Liberation Army who turned out for the 
meeting between special envoys for Darfur and key commanders 
of non-signatory rebel groups to the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(February 2007).
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